The Basel Process is a key element of the global financial system and a critical force that has been shaping the international financial architecture over the last 80 years. As such it plays an important role in co-ordinating the multilateral efforts of central banks, regulators, supervisors and market participants alike and is thus uniquely geared towards fostering and maintaining financial stability. Giving rise to current global financial turbulence, the recent subprime crisis has subjected the Basel Process to intense internal and external scrutiny. This episode of financial instability might yet prove be one of the most challenging tests for the Basel Process as authorities strive to improve their regulatory frameworks in search of incentives for prudent behaviour.
system. Strengthening both monetary and financial stability is the traditional remit of central banks and other monetary agencies, but achieving these twin objectives may not be possible without the close co-operation of other regulatory and supervisory bodies.
In addition, the various components and players of the global financial system -namely the financial markets themselves, institutions and the associated infrastructure -may not all be subject to the same sources of concern and threats. This requires different policy approaches and measures in order to achieve the stability of the financial system as a whole. Because the stability of the financial system depends so critically on the institutions, structures and governance arrangements that comprise it, continued policy coordination and cooperation is paramount. The so-called Basel Process plays a key role in providing the necessary policy framework. It is explicitly designed to strengthen the stability and resilience of the global financial system. However, the recent subprime crisis is one example of how financial innovation can give rise to global financial turmoil. This might yet prove be one of the most challenging tests for the Basel Process as authorities strive to improve their regulatory frameworks such that they give the right incentives for prudent behaviour.
Promoting monetary and financial stability
Promoting both monetary and fiscal stability are key goals for the authorities, but while there is broad agreement on the definition of the former, this is much less the case for the latter.
2.A. Definitions matter
Consensus with regard to the definition of monetary stability has emerged over the last ten years and permits various notions ranging from stability of the (anticipated) value of money to price level stability or even low levels of inflation. Indeed, there is also broad agreement that monetary stability is a vital ingredient for sustainable economic growth, that there is unique institutional responsibility for it (i. e. the central bank), and that the authorities need to be engaged in continuous efforts to achieve it. The story for financial stability, however, is somewhat different; there is a much broader spectrum of definitions and consensus only seems to exist in so far as financial stability is deemed a "good thing" and that it is mostly noticed by its absence.
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Broadly speaking, one can distinguish between a systems approach -primarily linking financial stability to a well-functioning financial system 2 -and a more narrow definition relating to the (excess) volatility of an observable financial variable, such as asset price volatility or interest rate smoothness. The debate around finding a suitable definition is more than a semantic one, particularly since any given definition predetermines the role assigned to monetary policy in contributing to financial stability.
2.B. A trade-off between monetary and financial stability?
In the sense of Tinbergen (1956) , if the monetary authorities only have control over one policy instrument, namely monetary policy, they can only achieve one independent goal, e.g. price stability. By delegating the broader objective of financial stability to a financial regulatory authority, time inconsistency complications of a direct trade-off between the two goals can be avoided. In turn, this raises the challenge for policy makers to identify suitable trade-offs between monetary and financial stability. The conventional view is highly skeptical concerning the existence of such a trade-off. According to this view, monetary instability is regarded as the main threat to financial stability, because inflation distorts perceptions about future return possibilities. Price stability is thus a sufficient condition for financial stability. In this sense, central banks should not focus on gauging the effects of asset price inflation on core inflation, but instead they should place their focus on capital requirements that increase with the growth of credit and are collateralised by inflated assets.
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More recently, as inflation rates have reached historic lows in most industrialised economies, a new school of thought has emerged which suggests that low and stable inflation can make financial system even more vulnerable due to the threat of asset price bubbles and the associated "irrational exuberance" of market participants.
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In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting views, Issing (2003) concludes that the strict systems-based definition of financial stability excludes any trade-off between monetary and financial stability, by definition. The key to solving this apparent contradiction lies in shifting the focus to the role of the policy horizon: In this context, a short-term conflict between monetary and financial stability may indeed be possible, as long as it is optimal for the authorities to deviate from desired rate of inflation to maintain price stability over medium run. With the clear definition of an appropriate horizon to which policy objectives should apply, the conflict disappears. In a more radical interpretation of the issue, Laidler (2004) argues that the authorities should stick to basic task of targeting inflation, while holding the lender of last resort (LOLR) powers in reserve. Consequently, policy makers should not be tempted by any form of trade-off, simply for the sake of achieving financial stability.
The institutional responsibilities for financial stability are traditionally shared across different institutions, namely finance ministries, the central bank and regulators. While clearly defined accountabilities for each of the institutions involved is a sine-qua-non, the actual goal of financial stability can only be brought about by an effective coordination of these efforts. This is the role of the Basel Process.
The Basel Process
In light of the increasing globalization of financial markets in the post-Bretton Woods era, central banks and regulatory authorities have recognised the growing need for a central vehicle for coordinating their efforts. With their various regulatory and supervisory initiatives and by providing the institutional building blocks, the Basel-based committees form the natural home for such a global coordination exercise. Collectively, this interaction of the committees and their working groups is referred to as the Basel Process. As such, it encompasses a global framework aimed at harmonising regulatory and supervisory processes and standards. Despite its global focus, one of the unique features of the Basel Process is its ability to incorporate regional elements without necessitating separate regional channels for cooperation. A wide-ranging treatment of the various aspects of regional harmonisation, particularly in Asia, and the Basel Process is provided by Yoshikuni (2002) .
3.A. Basel II
One of the most prominent recent initiatives arising out of the Basel Process is the new capital adequacy framework, commonly referred to as Basel II (BCBS, 2004) . After almost four years of intense consultation, Basel II was endorsed by central bank governors and the heads of bank supervisory authorities of the G-10 in June 2004. Himino (2004) offers a comprehensive overview of the Basel II framework, arguing that it provides a common language which improves communication about risk exposures among banks, supervisors and investors. The full text of Basel II and supplementary documentation can be found on the BIS website at this link.
Similarly, the Basel Process has served as the core infrastructure to facilitate the creation of such standards as the twenty-five Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCBS, 1997) or Basel II.
3.B. Components of the Basel Process
There are four main Basel-based committees that are at the very centre of the Basel Process. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), established by the G-10 central banks in 1974, deals with the activities of commercial banks. It is this committee (including its roughly thirty technical working groups) which is responsible for the new capital adequacy framework.
The Markets Committee together with the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), established in 1963 and 1971 respectively, broadly cover issues related to the functioning of foreign exchange and related financial markets.
6 Whilst both committees focus on recent financial market developments, possible future trends, and considerations of the short-run implications of particular current events, discussions in the Markets Committee are informal and are not released to the public. Discussions and deliberations in the CGFS, on the other hand, are conducted with a view to formulate appropriate policy recommendations for central banks. The topics monitored by the CGFS are also often referred to as 'macroprudential issues'.
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The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), established in 1990, focuses on market infrastructure issues and therefore monitors and analyses developments in domestic and cross-border payment, settlement and clearing systems. The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), established in 1994, deals with various aspect of insurance companies. Given the complexity and linkages between the various relevant topics that form the area of competence of the Basel-based committees, successful international cooperation is only possible as long as there exists a clear division of labour between the individual committees and their secretariats. Regular meetings at either the committee-or working group-level form the main mechanism that drives the process. However, a common criticism levered at meeting-based efforts driven by other international bodies is that such processes are overly bureaucratic, cumbersome. Furthermore, it is often argued that such committees lack a free and open exchange of views and discussions, not at least because of an alleged heavy influence through the opinions and beliefs of the organizing 7 See Borio, English, and Lowe (2003) for a detailed description of this concept and how it relates to other aspects of regulatory and supervisory arrangements. A schematic overview of such arrangements is provided in figure A.1 in the appendix.
body. The informal nature of the Basel Process avoids many of these pitfalls, despite a considerable amount of 'behind-the-scenes activities'.
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With many of the key issues pertaining to the stability of the global financial system becoming increasingly integrated across markets, participants and borders, the diligent coordination of activities amongst the committees is paramount importance. In this vein, (Yoshikuni, 2002, p.5) summarises the function of the Basel Process as one of "[. . . providing] the international financial community with the opportunity to explore good governance in various regulatory and supervisory issues in forums that allow a frank exchange of views with the support of highly sophisticated analysis." Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the specialised division of labour between the various committees involved in the Basel Process.
3.C. Evolution and Increasing Co-operation
The influence of market participants has rendered the Basel Process more transparent and market oriented. The inclusion of this new element into the process is probably best illustrated in the context of Basel II with the decision to allow banks to use their internal models to assess risks. Furthermore, financial innovations evolving at increasing speed and stronger global linkages between markets have called for the closer cooperation of the various Basel-based committees at different levels and intensities.
The deregulation, liberalisation and globalisation of financial markets during the 1990s led to an increasing erosion of the dividing lines between banks, securities companies and insurance companies. As a result, closer cooperation between the regulatory and supervisory bodies dealing with the specific segments of the market became a pressing priority. In response to this challenge, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) became involved more actively in the Basel Process with the explicit aim of staying in closer contact with the BCBS and IAIS. In 1996, a Joint Forum of these three committees was established.
Progressing globalisation also called for closer cooperation between those elements of the Basel Process which are responsible for the overall functioning and stability of the financial system. This has lead to a strengthening of ties of the CGFS and the CPSS with the other committees, respectively monitoring macro and micro aspects of the infrastructure of the international financial system. In addition, the BIS and the BCBS jointly established the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) in order to promote cooperation amongst supervisors, primarily through sharing experiences in workshops and seminars. The FSI's objectives are: (i) To promote sound supervisory standards and practices globally, and to support full implementation of these standards in all countries. (ii) To provide supervisors with the latest information on market products, practices and techniques to help them adapt to rapid innovations in the financial sector.
(iii) To help supervisors develop solutions to their multiple challenges by sharing experiences in seminars, discussion forums and conferences. (iv) To assist supervisors in employing the practices and tools that will allow them to meet everyday demands and tackle more ambitious goals. As the convergence of global best practices continued, the need for more coordination and cooperation also became more apparent at the level of various other international standard setting bodies and the institutions entrusted with monitoring these standards, primarily the IMF and the Word Bank. In 1999, the establishment of a more comprehensive framework for coordinating these efforts was placed under the umbrella of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which is hosts its secretariat at the BIS, but is operationally independent from the BIS and only reports to its members. The FSF is the main international body orchestrating financial stability efforts, bringing together national financial authorities, international finan-
The FSF is the main international body orchestrating financial stability efforts, bringing together national financial authorities, international financial institutions, international regulatory and supervisory groupings as well as committees of central bank ex-perts. It seeks to co-ordinate the efforts of these various bodies in order to promote international financial stability, improve the functioning of markets, and reduce systemic risk. In an attempt to improve the architectural blue-print for the global international financial system, the FSF designated twelve main standard areas as key for sound financial systems and deserving of priority implementation, depending on individual countries' circumstances.
As is shown in figure 2 , these areas can loosely be grouped into three categories, which in turn form the pillars that constitute the basis of sound financial systems.
(i) Macroeconomic policy and data transparency forms the first pillar of sound financial systems; defining standards for transparency with regards to monetary and financial policy, fiscal policy and data dissemination, this is almost exclusively the responsibility of the IMF.
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(ii) The second element focuses on financial regulation and supervision, in particular the principles and objectives that fall under the auspices of the Joint Forum with regard to banking and insurance supervision and securities regulation. (iii) The third pillar covers all issues related to institutional and market infrastructure, stretching from corporate governance, international accounting standards and auditing to payments and settlements. Both the BCBS (through the aspect of market discipline under Basel II) and, more directly, the CPSS through its Core Principles form Basel Process-related elements of this third element of global financial stability.
3.D. The Age of Turbulence: Current Threats to Financial Stability
Similar to its monetary equivalent, achieving financial stability is not a one-off effort, but rather a continuous quest by the various bodies involved in the process. In this context, the identification of potential threats is a key ingredient for a consistent strengthening of the stability of both national and global financial systems, the boundaries of which have become increasingly blurred due to increasing inter-market linkages. Put differently, the separation between national and global aspects of financial stability look increasingly artificial, not at least because of the incessant threat of contagion.
[PARAGRAPH on Greenspan (2007) ] At present, there are a number of issues on the radar screens of the different bodies involved in the Basel Process (listed in no particular order of significance or preference): -Resilience of financial markets and institutions: As historically low global growth rates lead to sharp corrections in market valuations, the balance sheets of many financial institutions are exposed to immense strain (skyrocketing default rates, collapsing equity markets and widening credit spreads). Unlike in previous comparable periods, the financial systems seem to have endured the recent slowdown remarkably well. Whilst there is ample evidence that markets currently perceive the system as stable and improving, there may be impending systemic risks that have built up in the process.
Could there be a threat to future financial resilience, if the macro environment does not improve further?
-Excess global liquidity: Accommodative monetary policy in many industrial economies has supported a revival of the global economy after several major adverse shocks. However, the associated strong growth in liquidity has raised some concern, including accelerated inflation, financial imbalances and spillovers from the G-3 to other smaller economies. -Concentration risk : Advances in financial innovation have lead to a redistribution of risks within the global economy. Recent events in CDO markets have highlighted that new financial instruments can lead to a concentration, rather than a diversification of risks among market participants.
[to be expanded] -Role of the central bank as LOLR vs. risks emanating from non-bank institutions (e.g. hedge funds) [to be expanded]
Outlook
The Basel Process plays a key role in the context of promoting financial stability. The various committees engaged in this process provide a unique platform or forum for discussing and analysing current sources of concern or threats to stability. All of which -in isolation or combination with each other, both short term and longer term -need diligent monitoring and a close consideration of the appropriate steps in order to ensure further progress in the respective fields.
4.A. Basel II and the current financial markets crisis
What are the implications of the recent financial upheavals in the U.S. sub-prime market for the Basel Process and for the supervisory and regulatory aspects of the international financial architecture? What lessons can be learnt? Did international standards, like Basel II, actually aggravate the situation, or even provoke it (e.g. the value-at-risk argument of increased correlations across markets during a financial crisis)? [to be expanded] In the context of the current financial market upheavals, the CDO-related multi-billion asset write-downs and credit losses of investments banks 10 seem to confirm many of the long-standing concerns and criticism by some of the most vociferous critics of Basel II. According to this view, Basel II harmonises investment decisions during a crisis, and regulation becomes destabilising instead of stabilising as a consequence. Danielsson et al. (2001) argue that Basel II fails to address many key deficiencies of the global regulatory system. They also maintain that Basel II is creating the potential for new sources of instability.
(i) In addition, Basel II fails to recognise that risk is endogenous (VaR-related risk measures can reinforce crises) (ii) Statistical models are inconsistent and biased, frequently unterestimating downside of risk. (iii) Problematic heavy reliance on credit rating agencies due to lack of regulation and unobservable risk estimates
10 By end-February 2008, the FT estimates total losses to exceed $181 billion.
(iv) Basel II does not incorporate a meaningful definition of operational risk, no adequate data or models (v) Financial regulation is inherently procyclical. Basel II increases this tendency significantly, thus increasing the risk of a systemic financial crisis (financial instability). In a related argument, Danielsson (2002) emphsises that since market data is endogenous to market behavior, statistical analysis made in times of stability does not provide much guidance in times of crisis. For regulatory use such as Basel II, the model and market-price risk measures may give misleading information about risk, and in some cases may actually increase both idiosyncratic and systemic risk. 4.A.1. "Without Basel II things would be worse . . ." -Basel II is not to blame, but rather the "Balkanisation of regulation". Thus the institutional fragmentation across market segments, across national jurisdictions within a global financial system is the main culprit for the current crisis.
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-Different treatment of on-and off-balance sheet assets in much of historic regulation. Thus, goal in future was for "regulation to be more consistent so the same risks get treated in the same way irrespective of who is holding them". -If implementation Basel II proceeded faster, banks would have had much less overleveraging. -Basel II's significant reliance on the scores from credit ratings agencies might have to be re-assessed.
4.A.2. "Basel II deepened the crisis . . ." -Regulators around the world have spent an unseemly mountain of money on Basel II, creating an industry using financial analytics and an army of consultants. -Basel II's main thrust on solvency might be a fallacy of misplaced emphasis, since it ignores the golden rule of banking. Most banks fail because of a lack of liquidity, not a lack of capital (e.g. Northern Rock). -Basel II contributed to the current financial crisis by providing incentives for regulatory capital arbitrage in the form of securitisation. 
4.B. Tentative Conclusions

